Every week this industry produces more reporting than any owner has time to read, and most of it gets compressed into a headline that says almost nothing about your business. This note goes the other direction. One layer down, behind the numbers, with a bias toward what an owner should do about them. It arrives every other week. It will not always be comfortable.
Woodbridge and Meiomi went for about 61 cents on the dollar
Last year Constellation Brands sold off its everyday wines: Woodbridge, Meiomi, Robert Mondavi Private Selection, Cook's, SIMI and J. Rogét. The Wine Group bought them, and the deal closed on 2 June 2025. Constellation's quarterly report for the three months to 31 August 2025 shows 846.5 million dollars in cash from the buyer. In February 2025, the assets it had set aside to sell, most of them in this deal, were on its books at 1,391.5 million. That's about 61 cents on the dollar, by my arithmetic. The February figure includes a few assets outside the deal and moved a little before closing, and neither changes the picture. Constellation had already written those assets down by 478.0 million dollars before it sold, so even against the reduced number it got about 93 cents. Either way, the seller ate more than half a billion dollars.
Look at what that 1.39 billion was made of. More than half was inventory. About a third was the property and equipment built to make it. Brand names and other intangibles came to less than a tenth. I read that as a set of businesses built for a market that moved more wine than this one does. Constellation said as much when it announced the sale on 9 April 2025: it would keep the higher-end brands, mostly priced at 15 dollars and up, that it called "aligned to evolving consumer preferences." It drew the line by price.
The Vintage Wine Estates bankruptcy shows the same thing further down the market, and because it ran through a Delaware court in 2024, every sale price is public. Layer Cake, Cartlidge & Browne and Tamarack went to Vino.com in a sale the court approved on 24 September 2024. The price was 6,028,313 dollars, worked out case by case from a set rate for each brand. The brand names are on the list of what Vino.com bought, with no price next to them. The names went out the door with the cases, and whatever they were worth rode inside that per-case rate.
This was a distressed sale, and it doesn't tell you what a healthy winery is worth. The other sales in the case point the same way. Adair Winery paid 85.0 million dollars, plus liabilities it agreed to take on, for Girard, Clos Pegase, B.R. Cohn, Viansa and Kunde, land included. Foley Family Wines paid 15.0 million, plus liabilities, for five brands, and Full Glass Licensing paid 3.2 million for three. The biggest number was the one with land in it. In Issue 01, I pointed to this case as the place where inventory carried at prices the market no longer paid finally came to light. The sale orders show what the market did pay: dirt and liquid.
Treasury Wine Estates, the Australian company behind Penfolds and a long list of California brands, put a name on it. On 10 August 2026 it told the Australian stock exchange that its review of the US business would focus on "structural misalignment within its US supply chain." By its annual meeting on 15 October, it was buying fewer grapes from growers, fallowing vineyards and cutting winemaking capacity. The same announcement booked a write-down of 99.8 million Australian dollars after tax, mostly against DAOU, Frank Family and Beaulieu Vineyard. That came on top of a 987.6 million Australian dollar write-down, before tax, in its half-year results of 16 February 2026.
Put it together and buyers are pricing wineries on the cash and assets they produce at today's volume, sorted by price point, and writing off whatever was built for a bigger market. Ted Hall noted in "The Marginal Acre," on his Substack on 12 July 2026, that vineyard appraisals have been slow to adjust and many still lean on sales from 2021 and 2022. If you're relying on an appraisal from then, you're relying on a number the market has moved past. The biggest sellers in the country have already moved past it. They took the loss in public and kept going.
Wine drinkers didn't leave. The boom did.
I think about a winery in terms of the jobs its wine does for the person drinking it. I count six: the status signal, the dinner-party default, the hobby, the gift, the cellar and the daily glass. It's my lens, built from thirty years on the selling side. No buyer in the documents behind this issue values a winery that way, and I'll come to what they use instead.
The first thing it shows is that your starting year decides the story. Measure from 2000 and two of the six jobs are flat. Measure from the mid-2000s or the 2015 peak and the same two are down. I use 2000 here, because measuring from the top of a run makes everything after it look like a collapse.
For the status signal, the closest measure I have is each category's share of US alcohol supplier revenue, from the Distilled Spirits Council's Annual Economic Briefing of 5 February 2026. It's a loose stand-in, and I know it. From 2000 to 2025, spirits went from 28.7 to 42.4 percent, beer fell from 55.5 to 41.8, and wine went from 15.7 to 15.7. Spirits took its gains out of beer. Wine peaked at 17.0 percent in 2015, so it's down 1.3 points from the peak and exactly flat from 2000.
For the daily glass, Gallup asks drinkers what they drink most often. Its Consumption Habits poll, taken 1 to 19 July 2026 and published 20 August, gives this:
Year | Wine | Liquor | Beer |
1992 | 27% | 21% | 47% |
2000 | 31% | 22% | 43% |
2008 | 39% | 21% | 36% |
2026 | 30% | 32% | 36% |
With 701 drinkers polled, the margin of error runs up to five points either way, so wine at 30 percent against 31 in 2000 is no real change. Against 2008 it's down nine. Liquor gained ten points from 2000, mostly out of beer. Measured from 2005, its eleven-point gain came mostly out of wine. That's the starting-year problem in one table, and anyone who quotes you the 2008 number without the 2000 number is selling you the steeper story.
For the dinner-party default, I'd look at the restaurant list. CGA by NIQ, which tracks restaurant and bar sales, put US wine sales in restaurants and bars at 13.8 billion dollars in 2024, down 5.3 percent. In its May 2024 release covering the 12 months to March 2024, wine's share of what people spent on alcohol in restaurants rose 0.4 points even as wine dollars fell. Wine held its share of a smaller check. These are CGA's public summaries of a paid product, and I haven't seen the tables behind them.
The cellar is the one job with a clean peak. The Liv-ex Fine Wine 100, which tracks 100 of the most sought-after fine wines on the secondary market, topped out in September 2022 and was down 26.6 percent by July 2025. That July, in "Is the end in sight?", Liv-ex compared the slump to the 2008 and 2011 downturns and said the end was in sight. Decanter reported on 22 June 2026 that the market was stabilizing.
The gift and the hobby are unmeasured. No US document I'd stand behind tracks wine's share of gifting, or how engaged its hobbyists are now against fifteen years ago, so anyone who tells you either is shrinking is guessing.
Count it up from 2000. Two jobs flat, one down from a 2022 peak that its own index compares with past downturns, one holding share in a shrinking on-premise market, two unmeasured. The drinker I'd have described in 2000 is mostly still there. What's gone is the run-up of the mid-2000s, and my read is that a lot of this industry's tanks, plants and brand portfolios were sized for the run-up. That's the capacity the sellers in the first section wrote off.
What buyers actually pay for
The people writing the checks are consistent about what they underwrite.
Chris Bitter, writing "Tangled Vines" for Terrain on 15 June 2026, says a vineyard's value rests mainly on the income it can produce, and investment buyers want a grape contract or a leaseback behind it. Treasury values its Americas business the same way, on forecast cash. Its 2025 annual report, restated to the Australian exchange on 1 December 2025, said that if those forecasts fell 11 percent a year, the cushion between what the business was worth and what it was carried at would be gone. The half-year write-down followed in February.
The law firm Farella Braun + Martel goes furthest. In "Mergers and Acquisitions in a Contracting Wine Industry," 14 April 2026, its lawyers write that an asset that once added value may now take it away, and that inventory, barrels, young vineyards and grape contracts can turn into costs. That's a lawyer's view with no figures attached. Every number in the first section is consistent with it, and I'd have a hard time arguing with it across a table.
Income, cash flow, price point, collateral. That's the buyer's vocabulary, and nobody in this record values a winery by the occasion its wine serves. So the lens is mine. An owner who wants credit for winning a job has to show it in the buyer's terms: the cash it throws off and the price point it holds.
The record has a counter-case, and it should temper anyone, me included, who thinks only focus gets paid. In 2023 and 2024, buyers paid full prices for broad portfolios that ran across several price points.
The private equity firm Butterfly paid 11.10 dollars a share for Duckhorn, about 1.95 billion dollars, closing on 24 December 2024. Duckhorn's own forecast for its 2025 fiscal year, in a shareholder filing of 13 December 2024, was 193 million dollars of adjusted operating earnings, before stock pay. So Butterfly paid about 10.1 times that figure, or 10.6 if you count stock pay as a cost. Duckhorn never called 1.95 billion the full enterprise value, so treat the multiple as close, not exact. In the same filing, Duckhorn's bankers at J.P. Morgan had Treasury at 12.2 times, Becle at 12.0 and Rémy Cointreau at 12.4. And even at that price, 11.10 dollars was 26 percent below the 15.00 dollars Duckhorn went public at in March 2021.
Treasury paid 900 million US dollars upfront for DAOU, announced on 31 October 2023, or 12.8 times DAOU's expected 2023 operating earnings, before any later payments tied to results. Treasury said it was buying to fill a gap at 20 to 40 dollars a bottle. That's a price-point purchase, in the buyer's own words. Less than three years later DAOU was among the brands written down, even though its depletions, the cases distributors sold on to stores and restaurants, rose 5.0 percent in Treasury's 2026 fiscal year, according to its full-year results presentation of 13 August 2026. The brand kept selling. The write-down is against the price Treasury paid for it, and that price was a forecast.
Breadth and price point got paid in 2023 and 2024. Since then the write-downs have reached luxury brands too, measured against what their buyers paid.
The discount is already on your books
A buyer pricing to cash flow and collateral will find the discount, and most of it is sitting in places an owner can read today.
Start with the club. Silicon Valley Bank's 2026 Direct-to-Consumer Wine Report, built on 450 winery responses collected in March and early April 2026, says the average winery started fiscal 2025 with 1,741 club members, signed up 414 and lost 446. That's 25.6 percent of the club walking out the door against 23.8 percent coming in, a net loss of about 30 members. SVB's own summary is that membership "is flat or declining." Its 2024 report put the dropout rate for fiscal 2023 at 19.0 percent. My 25.6 is a ratio of this year's averages, not a rate SVB printed, and different wineries answer each year, so take the direction and leave the decimal. And the survey can't count the wineries that closed, because they don't fill out surveys. The average describes the clubs still around to answer.
At that rate, the average club has to replace a quarter of its members every year just to stand still. The cost of that replacement sits in marketing and hospitality long before anyone builds a valuation, and a club revenue line that looks steady can be a shrinking membership with heavier buyers carrying it.
Inventory is the second place, and here the industry picture is better than it was. Allied Grape Growers measures how many months of shipments the industry has sitting in tanks and warehouses, against its own benchmark of 18 months. In "Global AVA 2026," 25 February 2026, Jeff Bitter put the excess at 3.7 months at the end of 2023, 2.3 at the end of 2024 and about 1.0, estimated, at the end of 2025. AGG's deck for a grower seminar on 18 February 2026 puts the 2014 to 2021 range at 17.8 to 20.1 months, so the industry is back inside its old normal. Bulk wine is another matter. Hilco Global, which appraises wine inventory for lenders, put bulk wine for sale in California at about 29.2 million gallons in March 2026, up from 24.8 million in June 2025, and called the bulk market structurally heavy, in "The California Wine Industry is Under Structural Pressure in 2026," June 2026.
That moves the problem down to your winery. An average that looks normal says nothing about the winery holding three vintages of one wine that stopped reordering. The banks have already put in writing how they count that stock. In the loan agreements Vintage Wine Estates (December 2022) and Duckhorn (August 2022) made public, the bank lends up to 85 percent of what bulk wine would fetch in an orderly sale, as appraised, and no more than 65 percent of the value of cased wine. Cased white more than three years past its vintage stops counting at all. Red stops counting after four years, beyond a fixed allowance of 10 million dollars at Vintage Wine Estates and 5 million at Duckhorn. Past that line the wine still carries its cost on your books and is worth nothing to your bank. I wouldn't expect a buyer to be more generous than the bank.
Rates are the third place, and Issue 04 covered the move. The Fed raised its benchmark range to 3.75 to 4.00 percent on 16 September 2026 and held it there on 28 October. The prime rate is 7.00 percent in the Fed's 29 October data, against a 2023 peak of 8.50. I've been telling owners for a while that rates would hold or rise, and not to carry inventory waiting for cheaper money, so the September hike didn't change my advice.
To put a number on what extra inventory costs to carry, take a simple example. Say you have 10 million dollars of inventory at cost, financed at prime with nothing added on top, which makes this the low end, and you hold the industry's average excess. The interest on the excess comes to 36,842 dollars a year now, against 144,931 dollars in 2023, about a quarter. Storage and insurance aren't in it, and I found no published insurance rate. At the average, carrying cost has stopped being the story. The winery sitting well above the average is the one paying for it.
How you sell it isn't why they buy it
I've seen this go both ways in deals I can't describe here. The public cases sit on both sides too, and they need sorting before they prove anything.
Winc built its business on subscription. It booked 72.1 million dollars of net revenue in fiscal 2021, filed for bankruptcy on 30 November 2022 and was sold for 11 million dollars under a court order of 18 January 2023. The filings don't give a cause, and I won't supply one. Naked Wines' full-year results of 23 July 2026 show revenue of 199.1 million pounds against 250.2 million the year before, and 486,000 members at year end against 581,000 at the start.
Both committed to a channel. Subscription is a way of getting a bottle to a drinker, and it says nothing about which job that bottle does once it arrives. A channel can fail while the job it served holds up somewhere else, and the reverse happens too.
On the other side, Constellation bought Sea Smoke for 158.7 million dollars in June 2024, per the same quarterly report, with no multiple disclosed. When it sold the everyday brands, it kept Robert Mondavi Winery, Schrader, The Prisoner, Kim Crawford and Sea Smoke. Which job each of those brands wins is my read, not the filings'.
I'd put Sea Smoke in the cellar and the status signal. Sonoma-Cutrer is the dinner-party default, a Chardonnay that made its name on restaurant lists. Both are brands a buyer can describe in its own terms: a price point and a set of accounts that reorder.
The clearest public read across price points comes from inside one company. Treasury's full-year results for fiscal 2026 show Penfolds' sales down 7.0 percent and its operating earnings down 15.2 percent. Treasury's Americas business was down 21.2 percent on sales and 61.4 percent on operating earnings.
When a winery could prove the job it won in those terms, I've seen it show up in the price.
What I'd actually do
None of this needs capital, and all three can be done before the year closes.
Value the business the way a buyer will, before one does. Take the cash the business threw off over the last twelve months, at the case volume you actually sold, not the volume in the plan. Before you trust the plan, go back three years and see whether each budget beat the plain guess that next year would look like the last. If it didn't, a buyer won't give it credit either. Mark your oldest inventory at a per-case rate you'd accept from a buyer pricing the liquid, the way Vino.com priced Layer Cake. Then write down the 2021 or 2022 comparable you've been carrying in your head and set it next to the result. The gap between the two is the distance between the business you think you own and the one buyers are paying for, and you'll have found it in a spreadsheet instead of in a letter of intent.
Rebuild your club on SVB's definition. Members at the start of 2023, 2024 and 2025, members acquired and members lost in each year, from your own file. Divide the losses by the starting count. If you're near 25 percent, you're the average winery in a survey where the average is shrinking. What it reveals is whether a steady club revenue line is covering a smaller membership, and how much acquisition spend you're putting in each year just to stay level.
Write the job next to every SKU, and how you sell it in a separate column. Beside each, put the evidence you'd show a buyer, in the buyer's terms: the price point, the margin, the accounts that reorder, the depletion rate. Where the only evidence is the story you tell at the tasting bar, write that down too. What comes out is which of your jobs you can prove in the terms a buyer uses, and which SKUs you've been carrying on faith.
Sources this issue
Constellation Brands, Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 31 August 2025, Note 2; Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.3, 9 April 2025; Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, 2 June 2025. In re Meier's Wine Cellars Acquisition, LLC, et al. (Vintage Wine Estates), Chapter 11, Bankr. D. Del. No. 24-11575 (MFW), sale orders and asset purchase agreements at Dkts 343, 344, 348 and 360, 24 to 26 September 2024. Treasury Wine Estates, ASX announcements of 31 October 2023 (DAOU acquisition), 1 December 2025 (Americas impairment) 10 August 2026 (US supply chain) and 15 October 2026 (2026 AGM address); Appendix 4D and 2026 Interim Results, 16 February 2026; F26 Full Year Results presentation and 2026 Annual Report, 13 August 2026. Ted Hall, "The Marginal Acre: The Growers Who Absorb the Correction," Substack, 12 July 2026. Distilled Spirits Council, Annual Economic Briefing, 5 February 2026, slide 7. Gallup, Consumption Habits topline, fielded 1 to 19 July 2026, dated 20 August 2026. CGA by NIQ, "CGA by NIQ reveals the ups and downs of wine in the US On Premise," undated web summary, accessed 24 October 2026; "CGA's new OPM wine data shows the category contracts but pockets of growth in US On Premise," 24 May 2024 (date per Wine Industry Advisor reprint). Liv-ex, "Is the end in sight?", July 2025. Decanter, "Wine investment: Fine wine market stabilising," 22 June 2026. Chris Bitter, "Tangled Vines," Terrain, 15 June 2026. Farella Braun + Martel, "Mergers and Acquisitions in a Contracting Wine Industry: Key Valuation and Deal Structuring Issues," 14 April 2026. Duckhorn Portfolio, supplemental proxy disclosures (DEFA14A), 13 December 2024; Forms 8-K, 7 October and 26 December 2024. Silicon Valley Bank, a division of First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company, 2026 Direct-to-Consumer Wine Report, June 2026; 2024 Direct-to-Consumer Wine Survey report. Jeff Bitter, "Global AVA 2026," Allied Grape Growers, 25 February 2026; Allied Grape Growers, SVVGA Annual Grower Seminar, 18 February 2026. Hilco Global (Sandy Mickas), "The California Wine Industry is Under Structural Pressure in 2026," June 2026. Vintage Wine Estates, Second Amended and Restated Loan and Security Agreement, 13 December 2022, Form 8-K Exhibit 10.1. Duckhorn Portfolio, Amendment Number Eight to First Lien Loan and Security Agreement, 30 August 2022, Form 10-K fiscal 2022, Exhibit 10.27. Federal Reserve, FOMC statements, 16 September and 28 October 2026; H.15 Selected Interest Rates, released 29 October 2026. Winc, Inc., Form 10-K fiscal 2021 and Forms 8-K, December 2022 and January 2023. Naked Wines plc, full-year results, 23 July 2026.
A note from Tony, every other week.
Always free to read.